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In Brief
Stolk et al. demonstrate that patients with
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex are able and motivated to select
communicatively effective behaviors
during social interaction. Yet, their
communicative decisions are not fine-
tuned with their knowledge of a social
partner, namely, knowledge based on
prior stereotypes and ongoing behaviors.
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Damage to the human ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) leads to profound changes in everyday so-
cial interactions [1, 2]. Yet, in the lab, vmPFC patients
show surprising proficiency in reasoning about other
agents [3–8]. These conflicting observations suggest
that what vmPFC patients lack in everyday social in-
teractionsmight be the ability to guide their decisions
with knowledge about a social partner [9–13], despite
preserved access to that knowledge [2, 14]. Quantifi-
cation of socially relevant decisions during live inter-
action with different partners offers the possibility of
testing this hypothesis. Eight patients with vmPFC
damage, eight patientswith brain damage elsewhere,
and 15 healthy participants were asked to communi-
cate non-verbally with two different addressees, an
adult or a child, in an experimentally controlled inter-
active setting [15, 16]. In reality, a confederate blindly
performed the role of both adult and child addressee,
withmatched performance and response times, such
that the two addressees differed only in terms of the
communicator’s beliefs. Patients with vmPFC dam-
agewere able—andmotivated—to generate commu-
nicatively effectivebehaviors.However, unlikepatient
and healthy controls, vmPFC patients failed to adjust
their communicative decisions to the presumed abili-
ties of their addressee. These findings indicate that
the human vmPFC is necessarily involved in social in-
teractions, insofar as those interactions need to be
tailored toward knowledge about a social partner. In
this perspective, the knowncontribution of this region
to disparate domains like value-based decision-mak-
ing [17–19], schema-based memory-processing [20–
22], and person-specific mentalizing [11–13] might
be instances of decisions based on contingently
updated conceptual knowledge.
RESULTS
Everyday social interactions often require acting on social stimuli
according to rules made cognitively opaque by their reliance onCurrent Biology 25, 14knowledge implied in the circumstances of an interaction and
presumed to be commonly known [23, 24]. For instance,
communicating even a simple spatial location relies on gener-
ating a response from an open-ended set of possibilities, on
the basis of a conceptual space continuously updated with
knowledge idiosyncratically shared across communicators
[25–29]. In contrast, laboratory tests of social functioning often
require binary decisions in situations that can be solved deduc-
tively (e.g., the Sally-Anne task [30]). Patients with ventromedial
prefrontal lesions can deal with the latter, but not with the former
[1–8], suggesting a dissociation between a preserved ability to
make logical decisions involving other cognitive agents and an
impaired ability to tune those decisions with implied knowledge
about those agents.
We tested for this dissociation by assessing whether a focal
lesion to the human ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
interferes with adjusting decisions according to implied knowl-
edge about addressees of a communicative interaction, while
preserving the ability to take effective communicative decisions.
Those decisions were quantified during live non-verbal
interactions between a communicator (the participant) and an
addressee (a confederate) on a digital game board (Figure 1A;
Movie S1). On each trial, their joint goal was to collect an object
from the game board. Only the communicator knew the object
location, and only the addressee could collect the object, leading
the communicator to select behaviors that the addressee
could interpret for understanding where the object was located.
These circumstances drive communicators and addressees to
converge on a limited but idiosyncratic number of strategies
from an open-ended set of possibilities, such that different pairs
use different communicative strategies to convey the same
meaning [26, 27]. The crucial experimental manipulation quanti-
fied alterations in communicative behaviors driven by implied
knowledge about the addressee, other factors being kept equal.
Namely, each participant was informed that he would be playing
the communicative game with two different addressees, either
an adult or a child, sitting in separate rooms with their own mon-
itors to see the communicator’s token moving on the game
board. In reality, a confederate blindly performed the role of
both adult and child addressee, with matched performance
and response times (F < 0.4; see the Supplemental Results),
such that the two addressees differed only in terms of the com-
municator’s beliefs (Figure 1A).
Previous work shows that communicators’ beliefs about the
age of their interlocutor influences their communicative deci-
sions during both naturalistic and experimentally controlled69–1474, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1469
Communicator
(participant)
moves the bird, visible
to the Addressee
Addressee
(’role-blind’ confederate)
collects the acorn based
on bird movements
1 8
A
B
Presumed adult addresee
Presumed child addressee
Figure 1. Communication Task and Brain Lesion Overlap
(A) The joint goal of the communicator and addressee is to collect an acorn
from the digital game board. Knowledge of the acorn’s location in the game
board is available to the communicator only (the bottom-middle square in this
particular example). However, only the addressee can collect the acorn. This
situation leads the communicator to inform the addressee, by virtue of
movements of a bird on the game board, where the acorn is located. At trial
onset the bird token is positioned on the central square of the game board
(nest), where it needs to be returned to signal the end of the movement epoch.
By touching a square on the screen with his/her finger, the communicator can
move the bird to that square, and this movement is also visible to the
addressee. However, the bird can only move to the center of each of the nine
grid squares, and only through vertical or horizontal displacements (Movie S1).
This feature of the task makes it difficult for the communicator and the
addressee to disambiguate the location of multiple potential targets within a
square (the white circles) on the basis of the location of the bird alone. In
contrast to the communicator, the addressee has no spatial restrictions on the
movements of the squirrel on the game board. Participants were informed that
they would be playing the game, as communicators, with another adult and
with a 5-year-old child, in alternation. A digital photograph of the current
presumed addressee was presented to the communicator in full screen before
the onset of each block of five trials and in the top-right corner of the screen
during each block. In reality, a confederate performed the role of both ad-
dressees, while remaining blind to which one of the two roles he was per-
forming in any given trial.
(B) Location and degree of overlap of brain lesion in eight patients with vmPFC
damage. The color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions. Maximal
overlap occurs in Brodmann areas 10, 11, and 32.
See also Table S1 and Movie S1.interactions, resulting in stronger emphasis on communicatively
relevant portions of utterances directed to a child [15, 16, 31–33].
For instance, the communicative game used in this study has
repeatedly shown that participants spontaneously generate
communicatively specific adjustments toward a younger
addressee, spending longer time on the location of the target ob-
ject, but not on other board locations [15, 16]. This experiment
exploits those communicative adjustments as a quantitative1470 Current Biology 25, 1469–1474, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltmarker of implied knowledge about other agents during socially
relevant decisions, in the context of a production task simple
enough to be performed reliably without training even by pediat-
ric and brain-lesioned populations [16, 34].
Eight patients with vmPFC damage (Figure 1B), eight patients
with brain damage elsewhere, and 15 healthy controls were
compared on task performance, with ‘‘voxel-based lesion-
symptom mapping’’ (VLSM) providing a data-driven index of
the relationship between lesion location and communicative per-
formance [35]. vmPFC patients’ decisions (66% ± 12% success
rate, mean ± SD) were well above chance level (6.7%; 15 poten-
tial object locations in any given trial) and as communicatively
effective as those made by the brain-damaged and healthy con-
trol groups (55% ± 26% and 59% ± 21%, respectively; p > 0.29).
For instance, both vmPFC and control groups used time as a tool
to put emphasis on communicatively relevant locations of the
game board (Figure S1). The three groups differed in terms of
the magnitude of communicative adjustment made to the pre-
sumed abilities of the addressees (F(2,28) = 5.2, p = 0.012, effect
size partial h2 = 0.27). Namely, the vmPFC patients had smaller
communicative adjustment than the lesion and healthy control
groups (p = 0.006 and p = 0.011, respectively; vmPFC, t(7) =
1.6, p = 0.17; lesion controls, t(7) = 4.5, p = 0.003; healthy con-
trols, t(14) = 2.3, p = 0.040; Figure 2A). An independent VLSM
analysis of the lesion-behavior relationship confirmed that intact
tissue in the ventromedial sector of the frontal lobes is relevant
for tailoring communicative decisions toward the presumed abil-
ities of an addressee (Z = 3.4, p = 0.0007; Figure 2C).
Two additional observations indicate that the failure of vmPFC
patients to tune their communicative behavior to other agents
was not due to motivational or perseveration problems. First,
vmPFC patients spent disproportionally more time than patient
and healthy controls on communicatively relevant portions of
the game board, independently from time spent elsewhere on
the game board (F(2,27) = 3.5, p = 0.045; vmPFC versus lesion
controls, p = 0.029; vmPFC versus healthy controls, p = 0.019;
Figure S1). This means that vmPFC patients made more
emphatic communicative movements than required, violating
the Gricean communicative maxim of quantity [37], but showing
that they were willing to invest resources in switching between
communicative and instrumental portions of their actions and
in marking a communicatively relevant location for the benefit
of the addressee (e.g., Movie S1). Second, after a misunder-
standing, vmPFC patients did not increase the temporal contrast
between communicative and instrumental components of their
behaviors, as observed in lesion and healthy control groups
(vmPFC versus lesion controls, U(12) = 4, p = 0.010; vmPFC
versus healthy controls, U(21) = 26, p = 0.028; Figure 2B; Movie
S2). Yet, vmPFC patients moved systematically longer after an
error than after a correct trial (t(7) = 3.1, p = 0.018), excluding
the possibility that the lack of error-related communicative
adjustments was due to a failure to detect or to react to the
discrepancy between the expected and observed behavior of
the addressee.
DISCUSSION
This study quantified the consequences of a lesion to the hu-
man vmPFC during live communicative interactions, providingd All rights reserved
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Figure 2. Communicative Adjustments and Voxelwise Relevance of
Lesion Site
(A) Communicative adjustments to the presumed characteristics of the
addressee. In this plot, communicative adjustments are indexed as the
normalized difference of time spent on the location where the acorn was
located between presumed child and adult addressees ([child  adult] /
[child + adult]), separately per participant group (vmPFC, lesion controls, and
healthy controls). The central mark is the median, the edges of the box are the
25th and 75th percentiles, and the whiskers illustrate the data range (besides
outliers).
(B) Communicative adjustments to a misunderstanding. In this plot, commu-
nicative adjustments are indexed as the relative difference between time spent
on the location where the acorn was located and the board locations visited
during a trial. The effect is between the trial after a misunderstanding and the
preceding trial ([trialt  trialt  1] / [trialt + trialt  1]).
(C) Analysis of the relationship between brain lesion and communicative
adjustment reveals voxelwise relevance for adjusting communicative de-
cisions to the presumed abilities of the addressee. For each voxel, participants
spared from a lesion to that voxel were selected from the entire sample pop-
ulation, and their communicative adjustments were compared against a null
distribution of no adjustment. The threshold of the color axis was adjusted to
resolve the spatial structure around the statistically significant peaks: z values
correspond to 0.005 > p > 0.001 (two-tailed). Peak voxels centered on MNI
(Montreal Neurological Institute) coordinates [4, 9, 36], falling into Brodmann
area 32 extending into area 10.
*p < 0.05. See also Figure S1 and Movies S2 and S3.
Current Biology 25, 14evidence that this cortical structure is necessary for adjusting
decisions to implied knowledge about a social partner. Patients
with damage to the vmPFC communicated as effectively as pa-
tient and healthy control groups, using time as a tool to put
emphasis on communicatively relevant locations of the game
board, a behavior functionally equivalent to the use of prosodic
markers during verbal communication [24, 31]. The crucial
finding is that vmPFC patients spent disproportionally longer
time on those locations, irrespectively of the presumed charac-
teristics of the addressee, whereas the control groups fine-tuned
their communicative decisions to implied knowledge about the
addressee. Furthermore, after a misunderstanding, the vmPFC
patients failed to increase the contrast between communicative
and instrumental components of their behaviors [25], despite the
incentive to adjust their behavior. These findings extend recent
observations on the decision-related dynamics of this region
during interpersonal communication [26], suggesting that the hu-
man vmPFC is necessary for guiding decisions with knowledge
about a social partner, as inferred from prior stereotypes and
ongoing behaviors [9–11].
This selective communicative deficit recapitulates the profi-
ciency of vmPFC patients in laboratory tests of social functioning
[3–8] and their impairments in situations requiring decisions
based on implied social knowledge [1, 2, 38–40]. For instance,
vmPFC patients might disclose intimate personal information
to an interviewer they have just met [2], fail tests that probe
humor interpretation and social expectations [6, 39], or accept
socially unfair financial offers [40]. Yet, those patients can reason
about the mental states of other agents, when those inferences
do not need to be fine-tuned with background information about
those agents [3–8]. Healthy individuals use vmPFC when mental
state reasoning requires access to this implied knowledge, for
instance to make inferences about the idiosyncratic mental
states of specific individuals [12, 13, 36, 41]. The pattern of pro-
ficiency and deficits observed across those studies and in this
work can be explained by considering a dissociation between
a vmPFC-independent ability to select socially effective behav-
iors and a vmPFC-dependent ability to adjust those decisions
with implied knowledge about other agents. The crucial deficit
appears to lie in the ability to use social knowledge for fine-tuning
decisions, rather than for making complex decisions or retrieving
social knowledge [2, 14, 42]. For instance, vmPFC patients have
verbal access to the concept of gender, but that knowledge is
not automatically taken into account during speeded decisions
[14]. Similarly, in this study, the vmPFC group accurately rated
the addressees’ ages (6 ± 1 and 21 ± 7 years for child and adult,
respectively; mean ± SD), but it did not use that knowledge to
adjust communicative behavior. Access to implied knowledge
for fine-tuning a behavior is particularly relevant during social de-
cisions, but it is also used in other situations in which choices
from a large set of possibilities are facilitated by embedding
those possibilities within pre-existing knowledge schemas [20–
22]. Accordingly, vmPFC patients seem to be immune to false-
recall effects during linguistic processing, driven by automatic
embedding of semantic items within existing schematic knowl-
edge [21]. This interpretation of vmPFC function suggests that
the contribution of this region to value-based decisions [17–19]
can be seen as an instance of its general role in adjusting deci-
sions according to continuously updated schemas for navigating69–1474, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1471
the search space of possibilities [43]. By the same token, the as-
sociation of this region with processing others’ emotions [4, 8,
44] might be a function of tasks requiring contingent updating
of agent-specific knowledge, rather than emotional material
per se.
This interpretation of vmPFC function is well grounded in the
connectivity profile of this region. On the one hand, the rostral
portion of this region (medial area 10) is robustly connected
with cingulate motor areas [45] and with the head of the caudate
[46], making it possible for the vmPFC to influence the computa-
tion of action values according to a model of their long-term ex-
pected consequences [18, 19]. On the other hand, both rostral
and perigenual portions of the vmPFC (medial areas 10 and
32, respectively) have strong reciprocal connections with the
anterior part of the superior and medial temporal lobe [45, 47–
49], making it possible for the vmPFC to access knowledge
schemas dynamically adjusted to an ongoing social interaction
[26, 27]. This connectivity profile endows the human vmPFC
with the ability to guide decisions with social knowledge
abstracted from prior stereotypes and continuously updated
with ongoing behavior, a capacity arguably necessary for navi-
gating through an ambiguous and fleeting social world [10, 50].
Methodological Considerations
It might be argued that the communicative setting used here is a
simplistic approximation of the complexity intrinsic in everyday
social interactions or in experimentally controlled decision-mak-
ing protocols [26, 42]. Actually, the current task requires the gen-
eration of communicative behaviors from an open-ended set of
possibilities, continuously updated with the shared knowledge
of the communicators [27]. These computational challenges
are well beyond the binary choices typically required during
lab-based tests of decision-making.
The communicative adjustments reported here might appear
cognitively crude and numerically tenuous, and it might be
argued that large communicative adjustments would be more
relevant. In fact, overly exaggerated displays would make them
more informative than required, violating communicative princi-
ples [37]. Accordingly, the subtle spontaneous adjustments
captured in this study are directly linked to daily communicative
abilities, quantifying the same cognitive capacity that leads
adults to modify their speech, gestures, and body motions
when addressing a child [31–33]. Furthermore, those sponta-
neous adjustments are reliable [15, 16] and have a temporal
precision more likely to reflect implicit knowledge than explicitly
designed strategies (e.g., Movie S3). Accordingly, those adjust-
ments provide the opportunity to compare decisions across
groups that might have different strategic biases and levels of
motoric performance.
The precise anatomical location and demarcation of the
vmPFC varies across research fields. For instance, in the deci-
sion-making literature, vmPFC often refers to a swathe of tissue
closer to the orbital surface (medial areas 11 and 14) [17]. The
cortex corresponding to the lesion site reported here has also
been labeled as rostroventral dorsomedial PFC [51]. Further-
more, recent work indicates that orbital and rostral/perigenual
portions of the vmPFC may differ in terms of their resting state
connectivity profile [47]. Unfortunately, those fine-grained par-
cellations and labeling schemes go beyond the resolution1472 Current Biology 25, 1469–1474, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltafforded by lesion-symptom mapping following vascular pathol-
ogy [52]. For instance, in this study, consistent but erroneous
lesion-symptom association may have occurred in the vicinity
of the anterior cerebral artery and its branches, requiring caution
when scrutinizing the VLSM result. Studying the consequences
of smaller cortical lesions not directly linked to the vascular archi-
tecture (e.g., after surgical resections) might allow one to resolve
whether and how these vmPFC portions may differ in their con-
tributions to human social decisions.Conclusions
Damage to the human vmPFC leads to profound changes in
everyday social interactions [1, 2]. By quantifying interpersonal
communication, we show that patients with lesions in that
cortical region are still motivated and able to communicate effec-
tively but fail to adjust their communicative decisions to the pre-
sumed abilities of the addressee. These findings indicate that
the human vmPFC is necessarily involved in social interactions,
insofar as those interactions need to be guided with knowledge
about an individual social partner. This conceptualization
of vmPFC function unifies disparate observations from value-
based decision-making [17–19], schema-based memory-pro-
cessing [20–22], and mentalizing phenomena [11–13], offering
a new window into the cognitive alterations observed in
disorders like frontotemporal dementia and autism spectrum
disorders [7].EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
The experimental procedures are summarized briefly throughout the Results
and are presented in complete detail in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Results, Supplemental
Experimental Procedures, one figure, one table, and three movies and
can be found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.
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